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I. Introduction
Over the last few decades, international arbitration has
emerged as the preferred mechanism for resolving international
investment disputes.1 There are currently in effect over 2,800
1.

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Recent Developments in
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bilateral investment treaties (BITs),2 agreements “drafted to
address a specific circumstance: that of an investor of one state
(the home state) locating assets in the territory of another state
(the host).”3 Many BITs require or allow foreign investors to
arbitrate directly against host countries, abrogating sovereign
immunity.4 Investors in such disputes regularly seek damages
totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.5 In short, international
investment treaty arbitration (ITA) involves high monetary
stakes, implicates issues of international comity, and is here to
stay.
Last Term, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina,6 the first case the Court
had ever heard concerning an international arbitration award
rendered pursuant to an investment treaty dispute.7 The case
raised factual and legal issues that are likely to recur given the
growing popularity of international arbitration. The BIT in
question is between two foreign countries—the United Kingdom
and Argentina—and provides for final, binding resolution of
Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 2 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD Recent
Dev.] (tracking the dramatic increase in the filing of known investor–state
investment arbitrations between 1987 and 2012).
2. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013
101 (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf [hereinafter
UNCTAD Inv. Rpt.] (noting that there were 2,857 BITs in effect at the end of
2012).
3. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY,
POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 1 (2010).
4. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 42
(2012) (“BITs . . . frequently contain dispute resolution provisions which permit
foreign investors to require international arbitration . . . of specified categories
of investment disputes with the host state . . . .” (citation omitted)).
5. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57 (2007) (reporting amounts claimed in
publicly available international investment treaty arbitration awards).
6. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014).
7. See Diane Marie Amann, Argument Preview: Jurisdictional Say-So in
Investor–State Arbitrations, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 20, 2013, 2:14 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-preview-jurisdictional-say-so-ininvestor-state-arbitrations/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“This case represents
the Court’s first consideration of an investor–state dispute arising out of one of
the thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that countries have
entered in recent decades.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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disputes by international arbitration.8 The BIT is silent on where
arbitration should be held, but contains a clause requiring
litigation of disputes in the host-country’s courts prior to
international arbitration.9
In 2003, BG Group PLC (BG), a U.K. entity that had invested
in Argentina’s energy sector, requested arbitration under the BIT
against the host country, claiming the Argentine government had
expropriated BG’s investments in response to a currency crisis.10
Neither BG nor Argentina litigated the dispute in the Argentine
courts prior to BG’s request for arbitration.11 The parties selected
the United States as the seat of arbitration, and in 2007, an
international arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favor of BG,
observing that failure to comply with the litigation requirement
in the BIT did not prevent the tribunal from reaching the merits
of the dispute.12
Argentina then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to vacate the award on the ground that BG
had not accepted Argentina’s standing offer to arbitrate contained
in the BIT, and thus had not fulfilled the host-country litigation
requirement.13 According to Argentina, the litigation requirement
was a condition on its consent to arbitration with an investor.14
Failing to satisfy the requirement meant the parties had not
formed an arbitration agreement and in turn that the arbitral
8. See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., art. 8(4),
Dec. 11, 1990, http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_argentina.pdf
[hereinafter Arg.-U.K. BIT] (“The arbitration decision shall be final and binding
on both Parties.”).
9. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text (discussing article 8(2) of
the BIT).
10. See infra notes 99–113 and accompanying text (describing the
underlying facts leading to arbitration between BG and Argentina).
11. Infra note 114 and accompanying text.
12. Infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. Despite agreeing on an
arbitral seat, Argentina maintained its position that the parties had not
actually formed an agreement to arbitrate. See infra note 114 (noting
Argentina’s objection).
13. See infra Part III.B (summarizing the district court’s opinions).
14. E.g., infra note 173 and accompanying text.
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tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.15 The district court
upheld the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed and vacated it on appeal.16 The Supreme Court
granted BG’s petition for certiorari on the question: “In disputes
involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court
or instead the arbitrator determine whether a precondition to
arbitration has been satisfied?”17
Throughout briefing and oral argument, the parties
disagreed about which legal principles the Court should apply to
determine whether to vacate the award as well as what result
should follow under those principles. BG and Argentina argued
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),18 interpreted through
domestic arbitration case law, provided the proper framework,
but differed on who should prevail under those authorities.19 The
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), participating as
amicus curiae, contended that the Court should engraft an
international appendage onto its domestic approach in light of
the distinct nature of the case and remand for further
proceedings.20
On March 5, 2014, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit,
holding for BG and sending a clear message to the international
arbitration community that the jurisprudence the U.S. Supreme
Court has developed regarding domestic arbitration extends to its
international counterpart.21 Specifically, if a BIT states that
disputes will be resolved by final, binding arbitration and the
parties choose the United States as the seat of arbitration or seek
to enforce an award pursuant to the BIT in the United States, it
is proper for U.S. courts to conclude that the treaty partners
15. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (arguing that the district
court should vacate the award).
16. See infra Part III.C (examining the D.C. Circuit’s opinion).
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, No. 12138 (July 27, 2012).
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012).
19. See infra Part IV.A (drawing out the parties’ main arguments before
the Supreme Court).
20. See infra Part IV.A (describing oral argument of DOJ).
21. See infra Part IV.B (describing potential implications of the Court’s
decision for international arbitration in the United States).
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expected U.S. domestic law on vacatur and enforcement to
control. Under U.S. law, courts afford arbitrators significant
deference.22 Accordingly, Part IV.B of this Note contends that
countries and investors using ITA, as well as private parties
engaging in international commercial arbitration (ICA), will have
a better idea of what to expect when they arbitrate or seek to
enforce awards in the United States, allowing them to avoid some
of the sticky issues that plagued the proceedings between BG and
Argentina.23
But what about Argentina and the text of the treaty, which
plainly insists upon host-country litigation prior to arbitration?24
What about the broader criticism that the current ITA regime
shortchanges host-country sovereignty in order to please foreign
investors?25 Or that host-country courts are better positioned
than international arbitral tribunals to decide questions of
host-country law, even if the arbitrators have the final say?26
These concerns deserve a response if ITA is to maintain its
prominence, notwithstanding the Court’s arbitration-friendly
decision in BG Group. Part V proposes a novel solution in the
form of an improved host-country litigation requirement that
stabilizes host-country law at the time of investment.27 Part VI
concludes that countries should learn from BG Group and
22. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
671–72 (2010) (“It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and
application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own brand of
industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
23. Infra Part IV.B.1–2.
24. See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (reproducing and
discussing parts of the U.K.–Argentina BIT’s dispute-resolution section).
25. See BORN, supra note 4, at 419 (noting that “investment arbitration has
generated substantial criticism” and that three countries have recently given
notice of withdrawal from a major multilateral treaty, “claiming that
investment arbitration erodes national sovereignty and favors foreign investors”
(citation omitted)).
26. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor
Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 876 (2005) (“In
most instances, the presumption must be that a national court is best suited to
interpret national laws.” (citing JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2005))).
27. Infra Part V.
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implement or improve host-country litigation requirements in
their BITs.28
Before addressing the implications of BG Group for
international arbitration in the United States and proposing an
improved host-country litigation requirement, some context is
necessary. Part II provides background on international
arbitration and briefly introduces a few of the various sources of
applicable law at play, including the role of host-country law and
the law of the seat of arbitration.29 Part III fills an existing gap in
the literature by summarizing in depth the BG Group decisions
in the lower federal courts, including the important U.S.
arbitration precedents relied upon by the parties and courts.30
Part IV.A builds on the analysis in Part III and draws from the
oral argument before the Supreme Court in December 2013 to
illuminate the March 2014 decision.31
II. Background and Sources of Applicable Law in International
Arbitration
Subpart A defines “international arbitration” and
distinguishes the two prominent types while highlighting shared
issues regarding applicable law.32 The remaining subparts
overview some, but not all, sources of applicable law: the BIT
itself, host-country law, rules governing proceedings before the
arbitral tribunal, the law of the situs (or seat of arbitration), and
the law governing enforcement of awards.33
A. International Arbitration Defined
International arbitration is a dispute-resolution mechanism. In
its simplest form, “arbitration” involves the submission of a dispute,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Infra Part VI.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part II.B–F.
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at the request of adverse parties, to a private, independent third
party for adjudication.34 The disputing parties agree they will be
bound by the third-party’s decision,35 and to that end, often seek
decision makers who are well-respected and possess subject-matter
expertise.36 It bears emphasis that arbitration is a creature of
contract. Party consent is a necessary condition.37
Broadly speaking, “international” encompasses matters that “in
some way transcend national boundaries.”38 Different countries’
arbitration laws define “international” in different ways.39 For the
purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that the FAA
controls which arbitrations conducted in the United States are
considered domestic and which are international.40 Section 202 of
the FAA frames which arbitrations are international41 and carves
out which disputes are domestic.42
34. See NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1–2 (5th ed. 2009) (tracing the origins of
arbitration); BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (“[V]irtually all authorities accept that
arbitration is . . . a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to a
non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties, to render a
binding decision . . . .”).
35. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 2 (explaining that
parties to a dispute are bound by an arbitrator’s decision because they agree to
be, not “because of the coercive power of any State”); BORN, supra note 4, at 5
(“[A]rbitration . . . produces a binding award that decides the parties’ dispute in
a final manner and is subject only to limited grounds for challenge in national
courts.”).
36. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 1 (observing that parties
may pick an arbitrator “whose expertise or judgment they trust”).
37. See BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that “[i]t is elementary that
‘arbitration’ is a consensual process that requires the agreement of the parties”).
38. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 8.
39. Cf. infra Part II.D–F (noting that different countries have different
rules for conducting arbitrations and reviewing arbitration awards).
40. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (laying out which arbitration agreements or
awards are international and covered by the New York Convention and which
are wholly domestic).
41. See id. (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a
legal relationship . . . falls under the [New York] Convention.”).
42. See id. (“An [arbitration] . . . which is entirely between citizens of the
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the [New York] Convention
unless [the dispute] . . . involves property located abroad, envisages performance
or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more
foreign states.”).
ON
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There are two major types of international arbitration:
international commercial arbitration (ICA) and international
investment treaty arbitration (ITA).43 Stated simply, ICA
“involve[s] commercial disputes between privates parties,” and
ITA typically involves arbitration by an investor against a
sovereign country,44 oftentimes under a BIT.45 Although ICA and
ITA are separate subjects, they overlap considerably.46 A
practical issue that arises in both contexts is which law applies to
a particular aspect of a given dispute.
In ICA, arbitrators generally have significant flexibility in
determining applicable law, and oftentimes awards rendered in
such proceedings will not contain “substantial legal developments
beyond the application of general principles of law.”47 Resolution
of commercial disputes turns predominantly on “the provisions
contained in the agreement of the parties, taking into
consideration the facts of the case as they appear from the
documents submitted by counsel and the witness hearing.”48 By
contrast, ITA requires an arbitral tribunal “to perform very
substantial, multi-step, legal work before reaching its final
decision.”49 The tribunal must inquire into its jurisdiction to hear
the claim and whether the claimant has standing to bring the
43. See BORN, supra note 4, at 41 (observing that “[m]ost international
arbitrations are international commercial arbitrations,” but “[a]nother
significant . . . category of international arbitration involves ‘investor-state’ or
‘investment’ arbitrations”).
44. See id. at 411 (introducing the basics of investor–state arbitration).
45. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 468–69 (explaining that
“[i]n light of the dramatic increase in the number of BITs and the emergence of
clearer legal principles through case law, the number of investor-State
arbitrations has mushroomed” (citation omitted)).
46. See, e.g., Campbell McLachlan, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The
Legal Framework, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 95, 98 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
2009) (noting that “despite the treaty context, investment treaty dispute
settlement uses the forms and procedures of commercial arbitration”).
47. Bernard Hanotiau, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Commercial
Arbitration: Are They Different Ball Games? The Legal Regime/Framework, in
50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
CONFERENCE, supra note 46, at 146, 146–47.
48. Id. at 147.
49. Id. at 148.
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claim.50 Divining the applicable law is a more complicated task
than in the strictly commercial context. A BIT is often thought of
as a “self-contained legal system,”51 and choice-of-law provisions
in BITs frequently direct a tribunal to consider, among others,
“the BIT itself, the law of the Contracting State, [and] the rules
and principles of international law.”52
B. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Itself
Historically, investments made by foreign entities in other
countries carried substantial risk.53 Under bilateral treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation—precursors to modern
BITs—“[t]he primary form of dispute resolution was in local
courts” with possible international arbitration between the two
countries.54 That is, investors lacked the ability to arbitrate
directly against a host country and instead were frequently
required to exhaust local remedies in the host-country’s courts,
after which they could seek diplomatic aid from their own country
if their efforts had not proven fruitful.55 This policy “conserve[d]
the resources of the home-state government by deflecting claims
that could be resolved by the investor in local courts” and
“preserve[d] the dignity of the host state by providing it with an
opportunity to rectify a violation of law and to accord justice to
the investor under its own law.”56 Investors were not particularly
fond of this slow brand of justice and wanted more protection for
50. See id. (“In investment arbitration, the issue of jurisdiction is nearly
invariably raised by the respondent. It leads the arbitral tribunal to determine
whether claimant has standing . . . , but also whether it qualifies for protection
under the applicable BIT . . . .”).
51. Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment
Disputes, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 401, 404 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Michael Kröll
eds., 2004).
52. Id.
53. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 3, at 38 (observing that, in the aftermath
of World War I, many governments engaged in “large scale expropriations of
foreign investment . . . as an instrument of economic policy”).
54. Id. at 24.
55. See id. at 428 (explaining the policy of “espousal”).
56. Id.
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their investments.57 At about the same time, many countries
desired to attract more foreign capital, leading to increased usage
of BITs that included international arbitration.58
C. Host-Country Law
Host-country law retains significance in international
investment disputes, notwithstanding the BIT movement and its
focus on international law.59 For example, “the typical definition
of an investment found in a BIT requires that the status of the
asset claimed to be an investment must be considered under the
host State’s domestic property law.”60 Unfortunately, BITs do not
always provide clear textual guidance on the applicable law,61
and those that do often fail to address head-on the appropriate
balance between international and host-country law.62
Most can agree that wedding investors to a body of law that
is subject to change by the host country at any time is
unpalatable,63 but BITs such as the one between the United
57. See id. at 3 (“Capital exporting states created the BITs to protect their
investment abroad . . . .”).
58. See id. at 63–64 (discussing how developing countries’ increased desire
to attract foreign investment beginning in the late-1980s after the Cold War Era
and the concurrent “revolution in information technology” contributed to the
relatively recent surge in BITs).
59. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW
WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES
69–70 (2007) (“The investments of non-State actors are creatures of private law
and tribunals cannot avoid addressing issues arising under the law pursuant to
which investments owe their existence in adjudicating treaty questions.”).
60. Id. at 182.
61. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 483 (observing that
“BITs do not always contain specific provisions on the law to be applied by the
arbitral tribunals appointed to resolve disputes” (footnote omitted)).
62. See id. at 483–84 (explaining that “BITs that do contain applicable law
provisions usually list the provisions of the BIT, international law, and domestic
law, without indicating which is pre-eminent or how they are to be combined”).
By way of example, Blackaby and Partasides lay out the choice-of-law provision
from the Argentina–United Kingdom BIT. Id. at 484.
63. See Guido Santiago Tawil, 2.6 Applicable Law, in UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ICSID 1, 15
(Rubens Ricupero ed., 2003), available at http://r0.unctad.org/disputesettlement/
course.htm (noting that “[s]ubsequent changes in the applicable [host-country]
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Kingdom and Argentina lack a strong textual defense against
this possibility.64 As a result, an investor may include a
stabilization clause in a subsequent agreement with the host
country concerning the investment.65 A stabilization clause
provides a means for investors to insulate their investments from
disadvantageous changes in host-country law.66 BITs themselves
do not typically contain stabilization clauses, perhaps because
countries party to the treaty do not want to relinquish the power
to alter their laws freely.67
D. Rules Governing Arbitral Proceedings
Parties may specify in their agreements or treaties that when
a dispute arises arbitration will be conducted on an ad hoc basis
or that the parties will seek varying levels of assistance from
specialized arbitration institutions.68 The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), created
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, puts forth texts
on various subjects of international trade law, including dispute
law may have a severe impact on the investment” and “may go as far as the
termination of the contract and the expropriation of the investor’s property”).
64. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at art. 8 (noting with regard to
applicable host-country law that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute
in accordance with . . . the laws of the Contracting Party [host country] involved
in the dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws”).
65. See JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 990 (2012) (observing that “[i]t is particularly prevalent in
investment agreements to incorporate stabilisation clauses that seek to limit the
impact on the parties to the laws in existence at the time the agreement was
entered into”).
66. See id. (“One way to prevent the effect of subsequent changes is to
introduce a stabilisation clause into the investment agreement. Such a clause
protects the investor from subsequent changes of the local law.”).
67. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 166 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that
stabilization clauses “are generally used only in agreements between foreign
investors and states or state-owned entities, where the possibilities for
legislative interference are most substantial”).
68. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 52–57 (discussing the
comparative strengths and weaknesses of ad hoc arbitration and institutional
arbitration).
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resolution.69 One such text contains the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules (UNCITRAL Rules), which are based in part on the notion
“that the establishment of rules for ad hoc arbitration that are
acceptable in countries with different legal, social and economic
systems . . . significantly contribute[s] to the development of
harmonious international economic relations.”70 The UNCITRAL
Rules provide a procedural framework that parties may invoke
wholesale or strategically alter at their agreement.71
Prominent institutions offering international arbitration
services include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), and the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA).72 These institutions do not adjudicate disputes but
instead administer disputes initiated under the institution’s
rules.73 Many BIT disputes are resolved through either
institutional arbitration under ICSID or ad hoc arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.74
69. See UNCITRAL, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 (2013) (describing
its “mandate [as] to further the progressive harmonization and modernization of
the law of international trade by preparing and promoting the use and adoption
of legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of key areas”
(footnote omitted)). “Those [key] areas include dispute resolution . . . .” Id.
70. See G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 (Dec. 15,
1976) (requesting broad distribution of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). The
Rules were subsequently revised in 2010. G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/65/22 (Dec. 6, 2010).
71. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 1(1) (2010)
(“Where parties have agreed that disputes between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, shall be referred to arbitration
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may
agree.”).
72. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 54 (listing examples of
the “better known” arbitration institutions).
73. See, e.g., Functions of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/DisputeResolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/Functions-of-theICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (outlining
administrative and procedural responsibilities) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
74. See BORN, supra note 4, at 412 (explaining that “many BIT arbitrations
are conducted under general institutional rules, such as the UNCITRAL Rules,”
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E. The Seat of Arbitration

Once parties have agreed where to arbitrate, the law of the
seat of arbitration (law of the situs or lex arbitri) provides
procedural rules that parties must follow during arbitration.75
The lex arbitri also sets forth the grounds on which parties may
vacate an arbitral award.76 In the United States, the FAA grants
the U.S. federal district court embracing the location where an
award is made the power to vacate the award on certain
procedural grounds.77 Although the Supreme Court has not
expressly held that the FAA provides the sole grounds for
vacating awards rendered in the United States, recent decisions
reflect this understanding.78

or under “specialized and sui generis dispute resolution mechanisms,” such as
ICSID).
75. See WAINCYMER, supra note 65, at 147 (explaining that “[t]he law of the
Seat or place of arbitration generally plays a central role in arbitral
proceedings” and “will, in most cases, form the lex arbitri”). Under such an
arrangement, national courts may be tasked with resolving “timing issue[s]” and
other “supervisory functions in relation to jurisdictional determinations.” Id. at
149.
76. See WAINCYMER, supra note 65, at 147 (“An award that does not comply
with [the] norms [of the lex arbitri] can be annulled or enforcement can be
refused on that basis.”).
77. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (“In any of the following cases the United
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration . . . .”).
78. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12
(2013) (declining to allow “[r]espondents [to] invoke a judge-made exception to
the FAA” to invalidate an arbitration agreement); AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–53 (2011) (holding that the respondents could
not rely on California’s doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate a consumer
contract in which they had waived class-action arbitration because the FAA
preempts state law regarding enforceability of arbitration clauses); Hall St.
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (holding that the FAA’s
statutory grounds for “expedited judicial review to confirm, vacate, or modify
arbitration awards” are “exclusive” and may not be “supplemented by contract”).
For an analysis of the clouded history attending whether “manifest disregard”
exists as another ground on which an award may be vacated under U.S. law, see
Patrick Sweeney, Note, Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-Nielsen and
Manifest Disregard, and a Proposal for Substantive Arbitral Award Review, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1585–1608 (2014).
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Typically, only national courts at the seat of arbitration have
the power to vacate or annul awards rendered within a country’s
borders.79 Even if an award has not been vacated at the seat, the
prevailing party will have to enforce the award if the losing party
does not comply voluntarily.80
F. Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards
Arbitral tribunals, lacking the coercive power that national
courts enjoy, cannot compel compliance with their awards.81
Fortunately, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)82 and the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)83 are
two major treaties that facilitate transnational enforcement of
international arbitral awards.84 There are currently 152 countries
party to the New York Convention85 and 159 countries signatory
79. See BORN, supra note 4, at 307 (“[B]oth the New York Convention and
national arbitration statutes . . . prohibit[] actions to annul awards outside the
state where the award was made . . . .”).
80. Infra Part II.F.
81. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 676
(paperback ed. 2011) (explaining that arbitrators “lack[] any direct compulsory
power” and that “[a]rbitrator-sanctioned seizure of assets . . . would in most
countries amount to vigilante justice, as governments jealously retain their
general police powers”).
82. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
(entered into force June 7, 1959).
83. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
84. See Gary B. Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61
DUKE L.J. 775, 837–38 (2012) (discussing how under both the New York
Convention and the ICSID Convention, “effective enforcement [of arbitral
awards] is available in national courts”).
85. Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE
L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention
_status.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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to the ICSID Convention.86 For present purposes, it is important
to note that the FAA implements the New York Convention’s
grounds for enforcement of arbitral awards.87
Unlike vacatur (or annulment) of an award, enforcement may
occur in many places. If the country embracing the situs of the
arbitration is a party to the New York Convention, the award can
be enforced in any other country party to the Convention, subject
to limitations imposed by domestic law.88 An award rendered in
an ICSID proceeding imposes a similar obligation and shields
awards from national court review.89 Given the efficacy of these
international treaties on enforcement, losing parties often comply
without a formal challenge.90

86. Member States, INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP.,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionV
al=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates_Home (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in
United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”); id. § 202 (“An
arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls
under the Convention.”).
88. See BORN, supra note 4, at 377–78 (noting that the New York
Convention “imposes a general obligation on Contracting States to recognize
awards made in other countries”).
89. See id. at 428
[N]othing in the ICSID Convention permits courts in a Contracting
State to review the tribunal’s jurisdiction, procedural decisions or
other actions, or to consider objections based on local public
policy . . . . Rather, Contracting States are required . . . to treat
awards as binding and to recognize them without any judicial
review . . . .
90. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 623 (stating that “the
vast majority of [international commercial arbitration] awards are performed
voluntarily”). But see UNCTAD Recent Dev., supra note 1, at 24 (“Enforcing
[investment treaty arbitration] awards against sovereign States remains a
difficult issue . . . .”).
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III. The Issue Presented by BG Group: Litigation Before
Arbitration
With some basic principles in mind, this Part III turns to BG
Group. A comprehensive discussion of the lower-court decisions
and the precedents relied upon sharpens understanding of this
complex dispute. Accordingly, after reviewing the underlying
facts and arbitral proceedings that led to an award in BG’s
favor,91 this Part examines the fight over vacatur and
enforcement in the lower federal courts. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia decided not to vacate the award and
instead confirmed it.92 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed.93 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and heard oral argument in the case on
December 2, 2013.94 The Court issued its opinion on March 5,
2014.95
A. Factual Background
Historically, those seeking to invest in a foreign country
faced significant hurdles to ensure protection of their
investments.96 The United Kingdom and Argentina signed a
bilateral investment treaty on December 11, 1990 to promote
cross-border investment and generate economic growth in each
country.97 Article 2 of the BIT protects foreign investments by
promising that the investments “shall at all times be accorded
fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and
constant security.”98
91. Infra Part III.A.
92. Infra Part III.B.
93. Infra Part III.C.
94. Infra Part IV.
95. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1198 (2014).
96. See supra Part II.B (discussing the emergence of BITs).
97. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at 1 (stating reasons for the countries’
agreement to the BIT).
98. Id. at Art. 2(2). Article 2 provides, in full:
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to invest
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With the BIT and its key provisions in effect, BG Group PLC,
a United Kingdom corporation,99 invested in Argentina.100 When
Argentina privatized its gas industry, BG secured a significant
ownership interest in MetroGAS, one of the previously state-run
gas utilities.101 By 1998, BG controlled approximately 45% of
MetroGAS.102 In late 2000, after struggles in Mexico and Brazil,
there were rumblings that Argentina might be the next Latin
American country to fall victim to a currency crisis.103 Faced with
continuing economic stagnation, Argentina took steps in June
2001 towards delinking the Argentine peso from its strict
one-to-one peg to the American dollar.104 In doing so, the
capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers
conferred by its laws, shall admit such capital.
(2) Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy
protection and constant security in the territory of the other
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its
territory of investors of the other Contracting Party. Each
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered
into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting
Party.
99. See BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, at 5 (Dec. 24,
2007), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf [hereinafter
Final Award] (noting that BG Group is “a British corporation located . . . in the
United Kingdom”).
100. See id. at 47 (concluding that “BG’s ownership interest . . . is an
‘Investment’ for the purposes of Article 1(a)(ii) of the Argentina–U.K. BIT”).
101. See id. at 10–12 (explaining Argentina’s restructuring of its gas
industry for the purposes of privatization, including the creation of several
distribution companies, and the successful bid by a group of investors that
included BG for ownership of MetroGAS, one of the distribution companies).
102. See id. at 12 (“Between 1994 and 1998, BG increased its investment in
MetroGAS from 28.7% . . . to 45.11% . . . .”).
103. See Larry Rohter, Argentina’s Economy Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/18/business/internationalbusiness-argentina-s-economy-casts-a-shadow.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(describing how Argentina had difficulty “maintain[ing] the [Argentine] peso’s
one-to-one link with the American dollar, becoming the region’s biggest
borrower in the process”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. See Clifford Krauss, Argentina Moves to Overhaul Peso’s Peg to the
Dollar, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/19/
business/argentina-moves-to-overhaul-peso-s-peg-to-the-dollar.html (last visited
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government sought to make Argentine exports relatively cheaper
and thus more attractive in the global marketplace.105 On
January 6, 2002, Argentina “formally abandoned” its peg of the
peso to the dollar and devalued its currency.106
Up until this point, recently privatized gas utilities could
collect tariffs107 and seek adjustments of the tariffs to keep pace
with inflation.108 But in light of Argentina’s persistent currency
problems, including the move away from its strict peg to the U.S.
dollar, the methodology for calculating tariffs became a source of
intractable conflict for MetroGAS and its regulators.109 In fact,
BG’s main contention in pursuing arbitration was that
MetroGAS’s inability to increase tariffs and collect the additional
revenue put the business in a financially untenable position.110
Article 8 of the United Kingdom–Argentina BIT lays out the
process for settling disputes between an investor and a host
country.111 Article 8(2) states:
[D]isputes shall be submitted to international arbitration in
the following cases:
(a) if one of the Parties so requests, in any of the following
circumstances:

Sept. 24, 2014) (reporting that “Argentina has announced a complex set of new
economic policies,” including implementation of a “floating exchange rate”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See id. (noting that the steps “should help Argentina’s competiveness in
Brazil, Chile and Europe, the markets for two-thirds of its exports”).
106. Larry Rohter, Argentina Unlinks Peso from Dollar, Bracing for
Devaluation and Even Harder Times, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/world/argentina-unlinks-peso-from-dollarbracing-for-devaluation-and-even-harder-times.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. See Final Award, supra note 99, at 13–20 (discussing the relevant
Argentine “Gas Law,” “Gas Decree,” and “The MetroGAS License,” which formed
the regulatory environment for MetroGAS’s operations).
108. See id. at 18 (laying out the tariff adjustment provisions of the
MetroGAS license).
109. See id. at 22–29 (describing the various steps taken by the Argentine
government that prevented MetroGAS from adjusting its tariffs).
110. See id. at 29 (summarizing BG’s prayer for relief).
111. See Arg.-U.K. BIT, supra note 8, at art. 8 (“Settlement of Disputes
Between an Investor and the Host State”).
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(i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from
the moment when the dispute was submitted to the competent
tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the
investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final
decision;
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has
been made but the Parties are still in dispute;
(b) where the Contracting Party and the investor of the other
Contracting Party have so agreed.112

On its face, Article 8 contemplates that an investor or State can
initiate arbitration only after a period of litigation in the
host-country’s national court system unless the parties to a
dispute agree otherwise.113 Nevertheless, having declined to first
litigate in Argentina or otherwise secure Argentina’s permission
to bypass litigation, investor BG filed its “Notice of Arbitration”
in 2003.114 On December 24, 2007, the arbitral tribunal, having
conducted the proceedings in the United States115 according to
the UNCITRAL Rules,116 held that Argentina had breached the
BIT and directed Argentina to pay BG approximately $185
million in damages.117 The tribunal explained that, “[a]s a matter
of treaty interpretation . . . [the litigation requirement in] Article
8(2)(a)(i) cannot be construed as an absolute impediment to
arbitration.”118 Unhappy with the result from proceedings it had
112. Id.
113. See id. (establishing that arbitration is only available if either: one
party has first litigated for eighteen months in the host-country’s courts; or the
investor and host country agree to proceed directly to arbitration).
114. See Final Award, supra note 99, at 5, 48 (noting the date of BG’s
request for arbitration and Argentina’s objection that “failure by BG to bring its
grievance to Argentine courts for 18 months renders its claim . . . inadmissible”).
115. Final Award, supra note 99, at 1 (noting that Washington, D.C., was
the “[f]ormal seat of the arbitration”).
116. See id. at 7 (“Because the Parties failed to agree on submission of the
dispute to [ICSID], BG submitted to arbitration under [the UNICTRAL
Rules]. . . . The Parties designated arbitrators in accordance with Article 7(1) of
the UNCITRAL Rules.”).
117. See id. at 138 (“The Republic of Argentina breached Article 2.2 of the
Argentina–U.K. BIT[] [and] . . . shall pay BG Group Plc. the sum of
US$185,285,485.85.”).
118. Id. at 50.
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not wholeheartedly embraced, Argentina petitioned to vacate the
award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.119
B. Denial of Vacatur and Enforcement of the Award in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia
In Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC,120 Argentina
asserted that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claims because BG had not litigated in the Argentine courts prior
to requesting arbitration.121 In conducting its analysis, the
district court used the FAA to assess the bases for vacating an
arbitration award rendered in the United States.122 The court
stressed the narrowness of its inquiry, noting that “careful
scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision would frustrate the FAA’s
‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,’”123
and that “under a more searching, appellate-style review, the
arguments presented by Argentina . . . could very well carry the
day.”124 Finding no grounds in the FAA on which to vacate or
modify the award,125 the court upheld the award, reasoning that
“Argentina ha[d] not met its burden of showing that the arbitral
panel exceeded its authority by entertaining BG Group’s claims,”
and the tribunal had “correctly turned to the text of Article
8(2)(a)(i) of the Investment Treaty and relevant international law
sources in attempting to discern its jurisdiction.”126
119. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112
(D.D.C. 2010) (noting that Argentina seeks to “vacate or modify [the] arbitral
award”).
120. 715 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2010).
121. See id. at 121 (noting that Argentina asserted inter alia that “the Court
must vacate the Award under Section 10(a)(4) [of the FAA] because the arbitral
panel improperly permitt[ed] BG to arbitrate its claims before seeking recourse
in the Argentina courts” (quotation omitted)).
122. See id. at 115 (“The Court’s authority to vacate an arbitral award is
governed by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) . . . .”).
123. Id. at 116 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)).
124. Id. at 126.
125. See id. at 121–25 (examining and rejecting Argentina’s various
arguments for vacatur or modification of the award).
126. Id. at 121–22.
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Argentina later filed a separate claim on whether the district
court should refuse to deny enforcement of the award pursuant to
the “public policy” exception in the New York Convention.127 The
court confirmed the award,128 explaining that Argentina “failed to
identify any fundamental public policy that implicates this
country’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”129 The court
concluded it was bound by the tribunal’s interpretation of Article
8(2) of the BIT in determining whether Argentina had consented
to arbitration.130
C. Reversal and Vacatur of the Award in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. It determined
that Argentina’s agreement to arbitrate was conditioned on
investors first litigating in Argentina.131 The circuit court framed
two central issues: (1) whether the United Kingdom and
Argentina had intended under the BIT that an investor could
seek arbitration without first litigating for eighteen months; and
(2) whether the countries intended for a court or arbitrator to
resolve such a question.132 As explained below, the second issue
127. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26–27
(D.D.C. 2011).
128. See id. at 39 (“[T]he Court concludes that the Award must be confirmed,
and that BG Group is entitled to damages . . . .”).
129. Id. at 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
130. See id. at 32–34 (explaining that “the Court is without authority to
deviate from the arbitral panel’s interpretation of the Investment Treaty in
determining whether enforcement of the Award would contravene the public
policy of the United States”).
131. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (explaining that the UNCITRAL Rules governing arbitration under
the BIT were not triggered because BG never satisfied the litigation
precondition).
132. See id. at 1369
The “gateway” question in this appeal is arbitrability: when the
United Kingdom and Argentina executed the Treaty, did they, as
contracting parties, intend that an investor under the Treaty could
seek arbitration without first fulfilling Article 8(1)’s requirement that
recourse initially be sought in a court of the contracting party where
the investment was made? That question raises the antecedent
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turns on whether the provision at issue goes to the substance of
the dispute or is instead procedural in nature.
1. Following First Options
Because the D.C. Circuit rested its opinion largely on the test
from First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,133 the case deserves
close discussion. The parties involved were First Options of
Chicago, Inc. (First Options), Manuel Kaplan, Kaplan’s wife
Carol, and Kaplan’s company—MK Investments, Inc. (MKI).134
First Options was a brokerage firm that “clear[ed] stock trades on
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.”135 MKI had a trading account
with First Options, and as a result of the 1987 financial crash,
MKI and the Kaplans accrued significant debt with First Options,
an issue the parties attempted to resolve in a series of “‘workout’
agreements.”136 One of the agreements, signed by MKI but not
the Kaplans personally, contained an arbitration clause.137 First
Options subsequently sought arbitration against MKI and the
Kaplans pursuant to that clause.138
The arbitral panel determined that it had jurisdiction over
the parties and claims and rendered an award in favor of First
Options.139 Although a federal district court refused to vacate the
award at the Kaplans’ request, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
“agreed with the Kaplans that their dispute was not
arbitrable.”140 Thus, the central issues before the Supreme Court
were: “(1) how a district court should review an arbitrator’s
decision that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and

question of whether the contracting parties intended the answer to be
provided by a court or an arbitrator.
133. 514 U.S. 939 (1995).
134. Id. at 939.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 941.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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(2) how a court of appeals should review a district court’s decision
confirming, or refusing to vacate, an arbitration award.”141
Regarding the first issue, the Court explained that “[c]ourts
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence
that they did so.”142 Here, the Kaplans had not personally signed
a contract to arbitrate disputes with First Options,143 and the fact
that they appeared at the arbitration proceedings to protest the
arbitrators’ jurisdiction did not preclude them from later
asserting that they had not agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.144
Accordingly, the Court found that “First Options cannot show
that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the arbitrators decide . . .
the question of arbitrability.”145
In resolving the second issue, the Court declined to fashion a
modified standard of review for courts of appeals reviewing
district court decisions on whether to vacate an arbitration award
under the FAA.146 Instead, courts of appeals in such instances are
instructed to review district court decisions under “ordinary, not
special standards,” meaning that they “accept[] findings of fact
that are not clearly erroneous but decid[e] questions of law de
novo.”147
No facts in First Options implicated international concerns.
The dispute was wholly domestic.148 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit
followed this precedent in BG Group, explaining that “the intent
of the contracting parties controls whether the answer to the
question of arbitrability is to be provided by a court or an
141. Id. at 940.
142. Id. at 944 (quoting AT&T Tech. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 649 (1986)).
143. Id. at 941.
144. See id. at 946 (explaining that it made sense for the Kaplans to be
present at the proceedings given that MKI was arbitrating disputes with First
Options and noting that “Third Circuit law . . . suggested that the Kaplans
might argue arbitrability to the arbitrators without losing their right to
independent court review” (citation omitted)).
145. Id. at 945.
146. Id. at 948.
147. Id.
148. Supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator,”149 and intent must indicate there is “clear and
unmistakable evidence” that the parties sought to “arbitrate
arbitrability.”150 As evidence of intent, the D.C. Circuit noted that
the text of the BIT did not expressly address the particular facts
of the case: when an investor who has not litigated in the
host-country’s courts as directed by the BIT immediately pursues
international arbitration.151 Accordingly, the court concluded that
there was not clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to
arbitrate disputes unless an investor had satisfied the litigation
requirement of Article 8.152 In other words, compliance with the
litigation requirement was necessary to signal that both BG and
Argentina intended to arbitrate any outstanding disputes.
2. Distinguishing Two Other Domestic Arbitration Precedents
The D.C. Circuit also distinguished its decision from two
other precedents.153 In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,154
the Supreme Court concluded that a court should answer the
threshold question of arbitrability when there is a dispute over
whether a successor firm after a merger is bound under an
149. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943). The court labeled the arbitrability
inquiry a “‘gateway’ question,” id., explaining that “[a] court will decide the
question ‘in the kind of narrow circumstances where the contracting parties
would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter . . . .’” Id.
(quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter, 537 U.S. 79, 123 (2002)).
150. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing First
Options, 514 U.S. at 943).
151. See id. at 1371 (“The Treaty does not directly answer whether the
contracting parties intended a court or the arbitrator to determine the questions
of arbitrability where the precondition of resort to a contracting party’s court
pursuant to Article 8(1) and (2) is disregarded by an investor.”).
152. See id. at 1370–71 (noting that the UNCITRAL Rules, under which the
arbitration was subsequently conducted, would provide clear and unmistakable
evidence of intent to arbitrate, but those Rules could be “triggered[] . . . only
after an Argentine court first has an opportunity to resolve the dispute”).
153. See id. at 1372 (discussing why the court of appeals’s decision is not at
odds with John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)); id. at
1372 n.6 (asserting that Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79
(2002), “is also distinguishable”).
154. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
by a predecessor firm and a labor union.155 But the John Wiley
Court then decided that the successor firm was required to
arbitrate in part because of “[t]he preference of national labor
policy for arbitration.”156 On this point, the D.C. Circuit, faced
with a bilateral investment treaty between two foreign countries
rather than a domestic labor dispute, departed from the result
reached in John Wiley.157
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,158 the Supreme
Court instructed that certain procedural issues do not really
constitute independent “questions of arbitrability” and are
presumptively for an arbitrator to resolve, not a court.159 In
155. See id. at 547 (“Here, the question is whether Wiley, which did not
itself sign the collective bargaining agreement on which the Union’s claim to
arbitration depends, is bound at all by the agreement’s arbitration provision.”).
In John Wiley, a labor union represented about half the employees of a
publishing firm. Id. at 545. The union had negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement with the publishing firm granting the employees certain rights “such
as seniority status, severance pay, etc.” Id. at 544–45. “The agreement did not
contain an express provision making it binding on successors of [the firm.]” Id.
at 544. The firm subsequently merged with another publishing firm, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., and a dispute arose over whether the collective bargaining
agreement survived the merger. See id. at 545 (“The Union’s position was that
despite the merger . . . Wiley was obligated to recognize certain rights of [the]
employees . . . . Wiley . . . asserted that the merger terminated the bargaining
agreement for all purposes.”). In light of this dispute, the union sought
arbitration. Id. at 546.
The Court addressed “who shall decide whether the arbitration provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement survived the . . . merger.” Id. at 546. The
Court concluded that courts should decide this issue because a party cannot be
compelled to arbitrate if the instrument that purports to require arbitration is
not binding on the party. Id. at 547. That a court should decide this question did
not, however, mean that Wiley was not bound to arbitrate. See id. at 547–48
(holding that a merger does not necessarily extinguish the rights under a prior
collective bargaining agreement and that “in appropriate circumstances, present
here, the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union”).
156. Id. at 550–51.
157. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1372 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (emphasizing that the present dispute “arises in an entirely different
context: an international investment treaty” and thus reliance upon domestic
labor policy would be misplaced).
158. 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
159. See id. at 85 (concluding that the applicability of a time limit rule on
seeking arbitration “falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes” that
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concluding that the particular claims-processing issue in that
case was for the arbitrator, the Court attempted to clarify that
the First Options framework requiring a court to answer whether
there is clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to arbitrate
arbitrability is only triggered in certain circumstances, such as
when there is “a gateway dispute about whether the parties are
bound by a given arbitration clause” or when there is
“disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a
concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of
controversy.”160 Outside of such circumstances, certain
“‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on
its final disposition,” such as whether a precondition to
arbitration has been satisfied, presumptively lie within the power
of the arbitrator.161
In BG Group, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the issues were
substantive questions of arbitrability that a court and not an
arbitrator should decide.162 Having determined that First Options
supplied the appropriate test of party intent and that the facts in
BG Group were sufficiently different from those in John Wiley
and Howsam, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and
vacated the award.163
are presumptively for an arbitrator to decide).
The dispute in Howsam concerned a business relationship between Dean
Witter and Karen Howsam. Id. at 81. Howsam felt that Dean Witter made
misrepresentations in providing investment advice and sought arbitration
before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) per Dean Witter’s
“standard Client Service Agreement’s arbitration clause.” Id. Among the
NASD’s arbitration rules was a limitation that no dispute older than six years
could be submitted to arbitration. Id. at 82. Dean Witter argued that Howsam’s
claim was too old and sought the assistance of the courts to prevent arbitration.
Id. Accordingly, the issue before the Supreme Court was “whether a court or an
NASD arbitrator should apply the [time limit] rule to the underlying
controversy.” Id. at 81.
160. Id. at 83–84.
161. Id. at 84–85 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
162. See BG Grp., 665 F.3d at 1371 (“The Treaty [between the United
Kingdom and Argentina] provides a prime example of a situation where the
‘parties would likely have expected a court’ to decide arbitrability.” (quoting
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83)).
163. See id. at 1373 (“[W]e conclude that there can be only one possible
outcome on the [arbitrability question] before us, namely, that BG Group was
required to commence a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait eighteen months
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IV. The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications

This Part examines the Supreme Court’s March 2014
decision as well as its implications for international arbitration in
the United States. Part IV.A briefly overviews how the parties
framed the issues before the Court at oral argument; it then
distills the main points from the majority and concurring
opinions filed in the case.164 Part IV.B closes with a few
observations on the practical impact of the Court’s decision on
international investment treaty and international commercial
arbitration in the United States.165
A. Setting the Stage
From the beginning of oral argument, BG parroted language
it had used in presenting the question for certiorari: petitioner
“ask[s] [the Court] to resolve this case narrowly by reaffirming
that an arbitrator rather than a court presumptively resolves a
dispute over a precondition to arbitration.”166 BG maintained that
if the case fell under the ambit of the Howsam–First Options
divide and the Court assigned the international component of the
case little weight, BG should win because the litigation
requirement in Article 8 of the BIT really resembles a “procedural
precondition” to arbitration.167 BG then explained that if the
before filing for arbitration pursuant to Article 8(3) if the dispute remained.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); id. (“[W]e vacate the Final
Award.”).
164. Infra Part IV.A.1–2. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent garnered the vote
of one other: Justice Kennedy. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct.
1198, 1203 (2014).
165. Infra Part IV.B.
166. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of
Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138) (U.S. Dec. 2, 2013) at 3
[hereinafter Or. Arg. Tr.] (beginning oral argument). Compare id. (framing of
the issue by BG at oral argument), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, BG
Grp. PLC v. Argentina (No. 12-138) (July 27, 2012) (“In disputes involving a
multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court or instead the arbitrator
determine whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?”).
167. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 5 (explaining that if the Court takes
up the issue of consent, it could do so through three separate strains of
analysis). See supra note 159 (explaining that the Howsam Court held that
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Court were to focus on the international component,168 the FAA
would still compel a ruling in BG’s favor because the parties were
aware when they agreed to international arbitration in the
United States that they were choosing U.S. arbitration law,
including case law such as First Options and Howsam.169
Following BG, DOJ argued as amicus curiae representing the
interests of the United States. DOJ asked the Court to vacate the
D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remand with instructions to apply a
modified standard of review.170 DOJ emphasized the
international component of the case, contending that “applying
the domestic presumptions that are set forth in Howsam [and
First Options] to this type of investor-state arbitration . . . would
not be appropriate.”171 DOJ framed the issue as “a question of
treaty interpretation, not a question of the likely expectations of
parties to a domestic commercial contract.”172
Speaking third, Argentina staked out its position that “[t]his
is a contract formation case,” in keeping with its contention that
its consent to arbitration was conditioned upon BG satisfying the
litigation requirement.173 Argentina noted additionally that after
certain procedural questions of arbitrability are presumptively within the power
of the arbitrator to decide).
168. Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting that the D.C. Circuit
in BG Group distinguished John Wiley on the basis that the latter concerned
domestic labor policy).
169. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 6–7 (acknowledging the United
Kingdom and Argentina did not know when signing the Treaty whether a
dispute of this nature would be resolved by a court or an arbitrator, “but they
d[id] know that the applicable law [would] be the [situs] of the arbitration”); id.
at 7 (“[W]e are unaware of any precedent from any country ever that says we
are going to not apply our domestic system set of rules, here the Howsam [and]
[F]irst [O]ptions lines, because this is an international case.” (emphasis added)).
170. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and
Remand at 11–12, BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina (No. 12-138) (U.S.
Sept. 3, 2013) (“In the distinct context of investor-state arbitral proceedings
conducted pursuant to investment treaties, courts should not apply [the private
commercial arbitration agreement] interpretive framework wholesale, but
instead should review de novo arbitral rulings on consent-based objections to
arbitration, and review deferentially rulings on other objections.”).
171. Id. at 27.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 37 (arguing that because the case is about Argentina’s
consent to arbitrate, the D.C. Circuit’s result was correct under U.S. arbitration
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an arbitral panel has issued a decision, national courts possess
“judicial review” over certain jurisdictional questions, including
whether an arbitration agreement was ever formed.174 Argentina
tied the arbitrability question—whether BG had accepted
Argentina’s offer—back into U.S. case law, arguing that under
John Wiley175 a court decides this type of issue.176
As noted above, the adverse parties both relied heavily on
U.S. domestic arbitration precedents before the Supreme
Court.177 DOJ stressed the international aspect of the case178 but
failed to offer a principled means of distinguishing between treaty
provisions that went to “consent” and those that were merely
procedural.179 Viewed against this backdrop, neither the
majority’s analysis nor its result is surprising.
1. The Majority Opinion
On March 5, 2014, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina.180 The identity
precedents and “treaty principles”).
174. See id. at 38 (arguing that “whether a contract was ever formed, [or]
whether there ever was an agreement to arbitrate [are] ultimately . . . issue[s]
for a court to independently de novo decide”).
175. For a summary of the pertinent part of the case, see supra note 155.
176. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 42 (noting that John Wiley held
there is “independent judicial review” when the question concerns “whether
there is an agreement to arbitrate at all between the parties”).
177. Supra notes 167–69, 175–76 and accompanying text.
178. Supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
179. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209
(2014) (“[W]hile we respect the Government’s views about the proper
interpretation of treaties, we have been unable to find any other authority or
precedent suggesting that the use of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty should make
a critical difference . . . .” (citation omitted)); Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 32
(“Is this litigation preliminary . . . a condition on the consent to arbitrate a
dispute? . . . [A]fter looking at the sources that the United States is telling the
Court it should look to, what is the answer of the United States to that
question?”); id. at 33 (observing that DOJ’s position seems to discard “all the
techniques that [the Court] use[s] in the Howsam–First Options line of cases”
and fails to “replac[e] [them] with anything else” (emphasis added)).
180. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014). The majority opinion was joined in full by
five other Justices: Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Kagan. Id. at 1203.
Sotomayor joined all but one part and wrote a separate concurrence. Id.
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of the author was telling—Justice Breyer penned the decisions in
both First Options181 and Howsam.182 His authorship of BG Group
signaled from the outset that the Court likely would not depart
substantially, if at all, from its domestic precedents. The Justice
cast the issue before the Court as follows:
[W]hether a court of the United States, in reviewing an
arbitration award made under the [United Kingdom–
Argentina bilateral investment] [t]reaty, should interpret and
apply the local litigation requirement [in the BIT] de novo, or
with the deference that courts ordinarily owe arbitration
decisions. That is to say, who—court or arbitrator—bears
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local
litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?183

After setting out the factual and procedural background,184
Justice Breyer explained how the majority, in no more than ten
pages in the U.S. Reports, would dispose of a case that had
wreaked havoc in every previous forum:
In answering the question, we shall initially treat the
document before us as if it were an ordinary contract between
private parties. Were that so, we conclude, the matter would
be for the arbitrators. We then ask whether the fact that the
document in question is a treaty makes a critical difference.
We conclude that it does not.185

Employing the legal fiction that a State-to-State Treaty is “an
ordinary contract between private parties” allowed the majority
to invoke and apply domestic precedents such as Howsam and
First Options without pause.186 In turn, the majority instructed
that under these authorities questions that go to substantive
arbitrability, such as “‘whether the parties are bound by a given
arbitration clause,’” are presumptively for a court to decide.187 By
181. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995).
182. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002).
183. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1203–04.
184. See id. at 1204–06 (summarizing events in Argentina, award of the
arbitral tribunal, and the subsequent decisions of the lower U.S. federal courts).
See supra Part III for a fuller account.
185. Id. at 1206.
186. See id. at 1206–07 (citing domestic arbitration cases).
187. Id. at 1206 (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84).
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contrast, “disputes about the meaning and application of
particular procedural preconditions for the use of arbitration” are
presumptively for the arbitrator.188
Having laid out the familiar Howsam–First Options
formulation, the majority faced little difficulty reaching the
conclusion that the host-country litigation requirement in the
BIT was of the “procedural[] variety.”189 Relying on the structure
of the dispute-resolution section of the BIT, as well as the BIT’s
mandatory language in connection with resort to international
arbitration, the Court reasoned that the litigation requirement
“determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not
whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all.”190 Further,
nothing in the BIT “give[s] substantive weight to the local court’s
determinations on the matters at issue between the parties.”191
As such, “the litigation provision is . . . a purely procedural
requirement—a claims-processing rule that governs when the
arbitration may begin, but not whether it may occur or what its
substantive outcome will be on the issues in dispute.”192
According to the majority, this requirement is “highly analogous”
to other provisions the Court has deemed procedural in its
domestic arbitration precedents.193
The Court next “relaxed [its] ordinary contract assumption
and ask[ed] whether the fact that the document before [it] is a
treaty makes a critical difference to [its] analysis.”194 But the
majority could find no authority that displaced the ordinary
contract assumption.195 It declined DOJ’s invitation to grant the
term “consent” in an international treaty talismanic significance,
188. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
189. See id. (observing that the “text and structure of the provision make
clear that it operates as a procedural condition precedent to arbitration”).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1207–08 (listing examples of various claims-processing rules
found to be “procedural provisions”).
194. Id. at 1208.
195. See id. at 1209 (noting that the Court was “unable to find any other
authority or precedent suggesting that the use of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty
should make a critical difference in discerning the parties’ intent”).
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noting that in the present case “we do not now see why the
presence of the term ‘consent’ in a treaty warrants abandoning, or
increasing the complexity of, our ordinary intent-determining
framework.”196 Although the BIT did contain evidence of contrary
intent, that is, a desire to have questions of arbitrability resolved
by a court, the evidence was not sufficient to displace the
ordinary contract presumption.197
In sum, the Court articulated that, in matters involving
vacatur or enforcement of investment treaty arbitration awards
in the United States, arbitrators receive “considerable deference”
when interpreting and applying procedural provisions, absent
evidence of contrary intent that would displace this
presumption.198 The Court closed: “Consequently, we conclude
that the arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations are lawful. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary is reversed.”199
2. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence
One of the chief challenges facing those trying to understand
and apply the majority’s decision will be determining its
breadth.200 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence provides critical
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1210 (explaining that a “treaty may contain evidence that show
the parties had an intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who
should decide threshold issues related to arbitration”). But the Court reasoned
that “the text and structure of the litigation requirement . . . make clear that it
is a procedural condition precedent to arbitration—a sequential step that a
party must follow before giving notice of arbitration.” Id. “The Treaty nowhere
says that the provision is to operate as a substantive condition on the formation
of the arbitration contract, or that it is a matter of such elevated importance
that it is to be decided by courts.” Id.
198. See id. (“A treaty may contain evidence that shows the parties had an
intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold
issues related to arbitration. But the treaty before us does not show any such
contrary intention.”).
199. Id. at 1213.
200. See id. at 1209 (“We leave for another day the question of interpreting
treaties that refer to ‘conditions of consent’ explicitly.”); Diane Marie Amann,
Opinion Analysis: Clear Statement Ruling in Investor–State Arbitration Case
Leaves Open Question on U.S. Bilateral Treaties, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014,
4:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-clear-statement-
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insight on this point because it emphasizes the narrowness of the
majority’s precise holding.201
Justice Sotomayor “agree[d] with the Court that the local
litigation requirement at issue in this case is a procedural
precondition to arbitration . . . , not a condition on Argentina’s
consent to arbitrate . . . .”202 But the Justice felt it was important
to acknowledge that if parties explicitly made such a requirement
a condition on consent to arbitration, then the result might be
different. She thought it was unnecessary and potentially
troublesome for the Court to state in dicta that “a decision by
treaty parties to describe a condition as one on their consent to
arbitrate is unlikely to be conclusive in deciding whether the
parties intended for the condition to be resolved by a court.”203
B. Potential Implications for International Arbitration in the
United States
1. International Investment Treaty Arbitration
As noted above, the Court’s decision in BG Group is its firstever pronouncement on ITA.204 If it had affirmed the D.C. Circuit,
the Court would have signaled to investors and foreign countries
that U.S. national courts are keen to intervene when arbitrability
issues arise during or following an international arbitration.205
ruling-in-investor-state-arbitration-case-leaves-open-question-on-u-s-bilateraltreaties/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“Whether in some future case the Supreme
Court will enforce such express provisions [as those conditions on consent in
U.S. treaties] remains an open question.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
201. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining that “I write separately because,
in the absence of this express reservation [regarding what the majority has
decided], the opinion might be construed otherwise”).
202. Id.
203. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
204. Supra note 7.
205. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1371 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (reasoning that Argentina and the United Kingdom “likely never
conceived of the need to specify that a court should decide whether Article 8(1)
and (2)’s requirement that disputes first be brought to a court should be
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Such a ruling might have proven a boon for critics who believe
international arbitrators wield too much authority in the current
ITA regime,206 but a bane to others who hold sacrosanct the
autonomy of the international arbitral tribunal. To reach this
result, the Court would have needed to conclude that the
litigation requirement constituted a substantive question of
arbitrability—a condition on Argentina’s consent to arbitrate—
the fulfillment of which a court should review independently.207
Instead, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled that
under existing precedents the district court was correct to
confirm the award, indicating that international arbitral awards
receive significant deference from U.S. courts on questions of
arbitrability.208 Extending existing domestic precedents might not
have been the most elegant solution, but doing so established
that questions of arbitrability, whether in domestic or
international arbitration, will be reviewed under the same
Howsam–First Options formulation.209 Specifically, it likely
means that when a BIT states only an arbitral tribunal has the
power to issue final and binding decisions, there is clear and
unmistakable evidence under U.S. law that the treaty parties
envisioned arbitrators, not a court, would decide whether
procedural preconditions to arbitration have been satisfied.210 As
respected”). “The [BIT] provides a prime example of a situation where the
‘parties would likely have expected a court’ to decide arbitrability.” Id. (quoting
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
206. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment
Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 394 (2012) (contending that ITA insiders,
including arbitrators, possess too much power and that “states . . . should sit at
the top of the decisional hierarchy”).
207. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1216
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Submitting the dispute to the courts is . . . a
condition to the formation of an agreement, not simply a matter of performing
an existing agreement.”). Whether an investor has fulfilled the litigation
requirement is “for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide.” Id.
208. Supra Part V.A.1.
209. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text (concluding no
alternative mode of analysis was required by the Court even though BG Group
concerned a BIT rather than an ordinary domestic contract).
210. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1210 (reasoning that “the text and structure of
the litigation requirement set forth in [the BIT] make clear that it is a
procedural condition” and that “[i]nternational arbitrators are likely more
familiar than are judges with the expectations of foreign investors and recipient
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such, investors and countries party to future disputes, as well as
U.S. lower courts, which have not yet decided an ITA case postBG Group, now have a clearer idea of the applicable U.S. law on
ITA.211
2. International Commercial Arbitration
The decision will also apply to international arbitration in
the United States more broadly. As noted above, ITA and ICA
draw on many of the same principles.212 Thus, parties to future
international commercial arbitrations in the United States or
those trying to enforce ICA awards in the United States will rely
on BG Group for guidance.213 Private parties enjoy the speed and
confidentiality that ICA provides.214 Confidentiality helps parties
maintain a working relationship while they resolve disputes
without attracting public scrutiny.215 But if the relationship has
soured during a dispute such that one party petitions to vacate an
award under the FAA, public court proceedings ensue and both
parties lose the benefit of privacy.216 Accordingly, to the extent
nations regarding the operation of the provision” (citation omitted)).
211. See supra Part II.E (describing the role of situs law).
212. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (describing similarities).
The BG Group decision will also influence resolution of arbitrability questions in
wholly domestic cases. See, e.g., Joe v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of S. Carolina, CA 0:14159-CMC-SVH, 2014 WL 2094978, at *1–2 (D.S.C. May 20, 2014) (noting that
employer moved to compel arbitration of race-discrimination claim and
explaining that “[a]rbitrability questions, such as whether an arbitration clause
covers a particular claim, are questions for the court to decide” (citing BG Grp.,
PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206–07 (2014)); Klein v. ATP
Flight Sch., LLP, 14-CV-1522 JFB GRB, 2014 WL 3013294, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July
3, 2014) (similar). Such domestic considerations are beyond the scope of this
Note.
213. E.g., infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text.
214. See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International
Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2012) (noting that “effective”
commercial arbitration typically includes “speed, economy, informality,
technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora”).
215. See BORN, supra note 4, at 15 (explaining that “most international
business prefer, and actively seek, the privacy and confidentiality that the
arbitral process offers” because it “focuses the parties on an amicable, businesslike resolution of their disagreements” (footnote omitted)).
216. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and
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the BG Group decision may be read to hem in independent
judicial review of arbitral awards and discourage vacatur
proceedings,217 private parties may be more likely to site their
commercials arbitrations or enforce their ICA awards in the
United States.
Thus far, U.S. lower courts have decided only a handful of
cases touching on ICA since March 2014. For example, in
Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of the Congo,218
plaintiff sought to collect on an English judgment that enforced
an international commercial arbitration award.219 Although the
panel held that the FAA did not preempt state law in this case
and the panel did not rely on BG Group for its decision,220 it did
cite BG Group for the proposition that the FAA “reflects a
congressional judgment that the ‘emphatic federal policy in favor
of arbitral dispute resolution . . . applies with special force in the
field of international commerce.’”221

Arbitral Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 234 (2005) (“[M]any vacatur
proceedings [under the FAA] result in a complete re-enactment of the arbitral
proceedings on a public record before a court. . . . An attempt to vacate the
award will, therefore, result in destroying the confidentiality of arbitral
proceedings.”).
217. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213
(2014) (“We would not necessarily characterize [the] actions [by Argentina] as
rendering [the] domestic court-exhaustion requirement ‘absurd and
unreasonable,’ but at the same time we cannot say that the arbitrators’
conclusions are barred by the [BIT].”).
218. No. 13-CV-7004, 2014 WL 3377337 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2014).
219. See id. at *1 (noting that plaintiff “prevailed in 2000 in an arbitration
in Paris, France,” “obtain[ed] a judgment in 2009 from a court in England
enforcing the arbitral award,” and ultimately “sued in the United States to
enforce the foreign judgment under state law”).
220. Id. at *11 (“[W]e hold that the limitations period in [the FAA] does not
preempt the longer limitations period in the D.C. Recognition Act for enforcing a
foreign court judgment . . . . We remand the case for the district court to
determine whether the English Judgment is enforceable under the D.C.
Recognition Act.”).
221. Id. at 8 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)); see also Seed Holdings, Inc. v. Jiffy Int’l AS, 13
CIV. 2284 JGK, 2014 WL 1141717, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2014) (reviewing
an ICA award and noting the distinction between substantive and procedural
questions of arbitrability (citing BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.
Ct. 1198, 1206–08 (2014)).
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In Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Exploration and Production
L.L.C.,222 Ecopetrol S.A., the national oil company of Colombia,223
and the Korean National Oil Corporation (Purchasers) sought to
enforce two arbitral awards against Offshore Exploration and
Production L.L.C. (Offshore).224 Offshore is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Houston,
Texas.225 Offshore argued that one of the awards “should be
vacated because the arbitral panel incorrectly determined that it
had jurisdiction over the dispute underlying the award.”226 But
the district court in the Southern District of New York rejected
this argument, noting that “[w]hen parties have clearly and
unmistakably submitted a disputed issue for arbitration, an
arbitral panel’s decision should rarely be set aside.”227 The court
relied on BG Group to support the proposition that because
Offshore did not dispute that the parties agreed to allow the
arbitrators to rule on objections to their jurisdiction, “the familiar
and deferential standards that apply to judicial review of arbitral
awards apply to review of the arbitral panel’s determination that
it had jurisdiction to issue the . . . Award.”228
As more U.S. lower courts have occasion to consider vacatur
and enforcement of ICA awards in the coming years, the citations
to BG Group will increase, and parties must understand where
certain dispute-resolution provisions fall on the substantive–
procedural arbitrability spectrum.
V. An Improved Host-Country Litigation Requirement
Although U.S. law on ITA may be clearer after BG Group,
the question persists: What can Argentina and other similarly
222. No. 14 Civ. 529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2014).
223. Offshore Exploration & Prod. L.L.C. v. Morgan Stanley Private Bank,
N.A., 986 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
224. See Ecopetrol, No. 14 Civ. 529, at *1 (“The Purchasers now seek to
confirm the Interim Award and the Supplemental Interim Award . . . .”).
225. Offshore, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
226. Ecopetrol, No. 14 Civ. 529, at *9 (footnote omitted).
227. Id. (citation omitted).
228. Id.
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situated countries do to more effectively protect their sovereignty
in bilateral investments treaties? Commentators have noted that
“[i]f investment arbitration is to fulfill its promise[,] . . . some
mechanism must be found to promote greater sensitivity to vital
host state interests.”229 The answer may be an improved hostcountry litigation requirement:
[A] lot of times nobody think[s] that’s going to change
anything, but you can understand Argentina or any other
country saying, look, before we’re going to arbitrate, you know,
try our courts, you may find—you may be surprised, right?230

This Part contends that ITA participants should heed Chief
Justice Roberts’s admonition to BG at oral argument.231 Part V.A
proposes language that treaty drafters should consider drawing
from or incorporating if they wish to create or restructure a
dispute-resolution mechanism that includes a host-country
litigation requirement.232 Part V.B explains how the proposed
language avoids specific problems that arose in BG Group and
asserts that an improved litigation requirement combats the
broader criticism that the current ITA regime does not
adequately protect host-country sovereignty.233
A. Proposed Language to Consider
The language below is not intended to be lifted from the page
and stuck directly into the dispute-resolution section of a
bilateral investment treaty. As with any agreement, the unique
bargaining positions and goals of the contracting parties will
heavily inform the drafting of the document, including the
229. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of
Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 399 (2003).
230. Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 11 (questioning of BG by Chief Justice
Roberts).
231. See also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1219
(2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation
to subject itself to suit by private parties; we do not presume that any country—
including our own—takes that step lightly.” (citation omitted)).
232. Infra Part V.A.
233. Infra Part V.B.
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dispute-resolution mechanism.234 Further, it would be foolish to
think this Note sets forth language immune from the
interpretation
controversies
that
haunt
all
complex
agreements.235
But given that “[m]ore than 1,300 of [the] 2,857 bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) [in effect at the end of 2012] . . . have
reached their ‘anytime termination phase,’”236 with a total of
1,598 projected to have reached that stage by 2018,237 countries
should be increasingly eager to modify existing BITs or tailor new
ones to their liking.238 With that in mind, the language below
seeks to generate ideas on how treaty partners can incorporate a
host-country litigation requirement that increases respect for
national sovereignty and aids arbitrators in later proceedings
while still affording investments sufficient protection:
All disputes shall be finally resolved by international
arbitration. Prior to arbitration, the complaining party shall
submit the dispute to the national courts of the country in
which the investment is located. During these proceedings, the
parties to the dispute shall undertake good-faith efforts to
brief factual issues occurring or having occurred in the host
country and legal issues involving host-country law. The
courts shall apply the host-country law in effect at the time
the investment was made, unless the parties to the dispute
agree otherwise.
Upon the earlier of a dispositive decision by a host-country
court or eighteenth months, either party to the dispute may
request arbitration. Before issuing a final award, the arbitral
tribunal shall review findings of fact and legal determinations
concerning host-country law made by the host-country’s
courts. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the host-country law

234. Cf. supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (emphasizing the
consensual nature of arbitration).
235. For an excellent volume on treaty interpretation issues in ITA, see
generally J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2012).
236. UNCTAD Inv. Rpt., supra note 2, at x.
237. Id. at 109.
238. Id. (“The significant number of expired or soon-to-expire BITs creates
distinct opportunities for updating and improving the [international investment
arbitration] regime.”).
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in effect at the time the investment was made, unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
The arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear any
objections that the above requirement to litigate in the hostcountry’s courts has not been satisfied.

B. Avoiding the Pitfalls in BG Group and Addressing Broader
Criticisms of the International Investment Treaty Arbitration
Regime
1. Good-Faith Obligation
Throughout the proceedings, BG contended that nothing
productive would have come from litigating in the Argentine
courts prior to arbitration.239 That may be true under the letter of
the United Kingdom–Argentina BIT because it does not require
that the parties litigate vigorously or until a court issues a
decision, only that the parties to the dispute maintain a case in
the Argentine courts for eighteen months.240 By including a
good-faith obligation to litigate, the proposed language
incentivizes investors and host countries to develop a record in
the host-country’s courts.241 Even if they do not, there is still
recourse to arbitration after a period of time.242

239. See, e.g., Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 57–58 (suggesting that BG
could have simply filed in the Argentine courts and then waited eighteen
months without doing anything else to fulfill the litigation requirement).
240. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (laying out the disputeresolution section from the BIT); Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 45–47
(questioning whether the eighteen-month requirement was really useful for the
parties and a condition on consent to arbitration when BG could have simply
filed a suit in the courts and “ke[pt] it alive perfunctorily” to satisfy the
requirement).
241. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 70 (“At time tribunals will
have to consider findings of domestic law by national courts, tribunals, or
regulatory bodies on the status of investments in domestic legal systems.”). “[I]n
the absence of any evidence that the findings are tainted by some lack of due
process, deference should be shown to decisions of domestic courts or tribunals.”
Id. (citation omitted).
242. Supra Part V.A.
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2. Stabilization of Applicable Host-Country Law

Effective usage of stabilization clauses in individual
commercial agreements between foreign investors and countries
inspires their inclusion here.243 During development of the record
in the host-country courts, the stabilization clauses protect
investors from adverse changes in host-country law.244 The
proposed language freezes applicable host-country law for the
purposes of litigation and arbitration at that which is in effect
when an investment is made. It ensures that the host country
cannot legislate to the detriment of investors after an investment
is made, a fundamental goal of BITs.245 Accordingly, investors
would be able to learn on the front-end the contours of the
domestic law that will apply if a dispute arises. For example, in
disputes involving regulatory expropriation by the host country,
the investor could point to the text of the BIT to support its
position on applicable host-country law rather than hoping an
arbitral tribunal will later discard the litigation requirement
because it believes the host country impeded the investor’s ability
to litigate in the courts, as was the case in BG Group.246 Instead
of stabilizing the law at the time the treaty is signed for all
investments ever made under the BIT, the proposed language
freezes host-country law at the time of investment for particular
investments, allowing the host country to retain more legislative
flexibility.247

243. Supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part II.C (describing the role of host-country law in
international arbitration).
245. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that a goal of BITs
generally is the “stabilizing effect . . . of preserving a particular set of host state
policies”). “The role of the BIT . . . is to stabilize . . . obligations, either to
reassure investors or to prevent an easy reversal of the underlying policies, and
to publicize the stabilization.” Id.
246. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (suggesting that countries
typically refrain from including stabilization clauses in treaties).
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3. Clear Deference to the Arbitral Tribunal on Challenges to
Compliance with the Litigation Requirement
The amount of discretion and deference that should be
afforded arbitrators was a major point of contention in BG Group.
As noted above, the Court’s opinion invoked the substantive–
procedural delineation for whether questions of arbitrability are
for a court or an arbitrator.248 However, given that BITs rarely
mirror one another exactly, it is difficult to say, based on BG
Group, which side of the substance–procedure divide provisions
from other treaties would fall if reviewed by a U.S. court or
another national court.249
The proposed language avoids this issue by clearly
committing to the arbitral tribunal challenges regarding
fulfillment of the litigation requirement.250 But it also requires
arbitral tribunals to examine host-country rulings before issuing
a final decision.251 The language does not mandate the tribunal
follow a particular standard of review. The goal is to require
arbitrators to consider host-country court findings without
imposing an artificial standard likely to engender unnecessary
acrimony over whether the standard has been correctly
employed.252 In this way, the language attempts to encourage
sequential review of certain issues but does not contemplate a
separate judicial body would substantively review the decisions of
the arbitrators.
VI. Conclusion
In the foreseeable future, direct international arbitration
between foreign investors and host countries will remain the
248. Supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part IV.A.2 (describing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and
her emphasis on the narrowness of the Court’s decision).
250. Supra Part V.A.
251. Supra Part V.A.
252. But cf. Bjorklund, supra note 26, at 812–13 (advocating for “sequential
review” in order to “maximize[] the dispensation of justice to a particular
investor and minimize[] intrusion on the sovereignty of the state whose system
is being called into question”).
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dominant method of conclusively resolving investment disputes
arising out of international treaties. It is paramount to many
foreign investors that BITs include access to a neutral,
independent tribunal to ensure protection of investments. But
many critics and countries argue that the current international
investment treaty arbitration regime does not take adequate
measure of national sovereignty concerns. The case of BG Group,
PLC v. Republic of Argentina throws this theme into sharp relief.
By the plain text of the BIT, Argentina required any U.K.
investor to litigate in its courts before seeking arbitration. But
arbitration was held in the United States before either BG or
Argentina had litigated, and the Supreme Court of the United
States determined it should not disturb the findings of the
arbitrators.
The facts and ultimate legal disposition of BG Group should
prompt countries to consider implementing or improving hostcountry litigation requirements in their BITs. Such requirements,
drawing from the concepts mentioned above, would help the ITA
system reach the proper balance between national sovereignty
and investment protection.

